We consider lending and investment under asymmetric information in an emerging economy.
Introduction
In the process of economic development, every country faces the following important policy decision:
When and to what extent should the capital account be opened? At best, increasing access to inexpensive foreign capital stimulates an investment boom and facilitates economic growth. At worst, increasing access to inexpensive foreign capital causes severe damage to the economy that potentially culminates in an economic and Þnancial crises. What often distinguishes success from failure is the structure of domestic Þnancial markets. If Þnancial markets direct the ßow of new capital towards productive projects, the economy beneÞts. If Þnancial markets direct the ßow of new capital towards unproductive projects, the economy suffers. However, the structure of Þnancial markets is endogenous. Opening the capital account alters the incentives of Þnancial intermediaries and the structure of Þnancial markets. In this paper we conduct an analysis of the costs and beneÞts associated with opening the capital account in a model that allows for the endogenous formation of different Þnancial arrangements.
There is a substantial body of work concerned with the sequence of structural adjustment and Since the recent Asian Þnancial crisis economists have sought to explain the apparent fragility of Þnancial systems in emerging markets. Recent empirical work by Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) shows that the liberalization of capital account and Þnancial markets often leads to an excessive (bank) credit expansion, which often precedes Þnancial crises. Chang and Velasco (2001) and Gale (1998, 1999 ) focus on the relationship between the foreign capital in-ßow and the potential for bank runs in the domestic Þnancial system as the source of fragility. Rajan (2001a and 2001b ) examine the effect of capital account liberalization on domestic credit market liquidity.
Unlike these papers, our focus is on understanding how liberalizing the capital account changes the role of Þnancial intermediaries in eliminating the moral hazard problem stemming from asymmetric information.
In this paper, we study the role a Þnancial intermediary (FI thereafter), with the ability to monitor the actions of borrowers (entrepreneurs), can play in solving the moral hazard problem when there is lending and investment under asymmetric information. Similar to Diamond (1984) and Williamson (1986) we examine the conditions under which a FI will arise endogenously. Unlike these papers, we consider how opening the capital account will affect the incentives of the FI to monitor. The ex ante monitoring technology in our model is similar to Diamond (1989) and (1991), except we solve the general equilibrium level of interest rate for the economy. In addition to the moral hazard problem in the choice of investment by entrepreneurs, the small, closed economy lacks funds and cannot meet the investment demand to fund all positive NPV projects. If the home country decides to open its capital account to foreign investors, the domestic, risk-free interest rate will equal to the international level. We assume that in the closed economy a monopolistic FI can arise endogenously and become the sole provider of loans to entrepreneurs. On the other hand, we study two distinct cases in the credit market following the opening of capital account: Þrst, no foreign intermediaries enter domestic credit market; second, the intermediation sector becomes perfectly competitive following the further liberalization of the Þnancial sector in addition to capital account.
We Þnd that in some cases when the monitoring technology is expensive and not very informative that opening the capital account reduces the proÞtability of a monopolistic FI. This occurs because the access to a foreign bond market raises the opportunity cost of a domestic depositor, thereby raising the cost of funds to the monopolistic FI. Similarly, the opportunity cost of foregoing direct lending has increased for entrepreneurs and thus the monopolistic FI must offer a lower interest rate in order to attract an entrepreneur. Consequently, in the open economy the monopolistic FI may end up operating at a loss and thus choose to exit the market. In this case, the only equilibrium involves direct, unmonitored lending. Thus the opening of the capital account will lead to a substantial shift towards riskier projects aggravated by the reduced incentives of the monopolistic FI to monitor. Furthermore, we examine how the competitive structure of the intermediation sector affects aggregate output. For similar reasons, we Þnd that concurrently allowing for competition in the Þnancial intermediary sector and opening the capital account may lead to an aggregate shift towards riskier, less productive projects. On the other hand, with a monitoring technology that is informative or inexpensive, opening the capital account leads to an aggregate shift towards more productive projects. In the more competitive credit market of the open economy the domestic Þnancial intermediary has incentive to lower the rate on loans it charges in the closed economy. shows that a strong institutional environment strengthens the intermediation sector and reduces the likelihood of a banking crisis following liberalization (e.g., Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache 1998). This is consistent with our prediction.
Our results also provide implications of how the world interest rates affect domestic economy when it liberalizes its capital account. First, we show that the minimum efficient level of monitoring technology to support either a viable monopolistic or competitive domestic FI in the open economy is higher when the opportunity cost of lending in the world market is higher. This implies that the domestic Þnancial intermediary will be better off when the international opportunity cost of lending is lower than that of the closed economy. Second, when a country has a developed Þnancial intermediation sector and liberalizes its Þnancial sector, the domestic FI will also be better off when the international opportunity cost of lending is low. Within this environment of low cost of lending, the domestic FI has stronger incentive to lower the rate on loans and along with a lower critical level of monitoring technology the FI can provide incentives to entrepreneurs to shift from negative NPV projects to positive NPV projects. A welfare improvement following liberalization is more likely to occur in this environment.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the basic model of investment and lending in a closed economy and derive a credit market equilibrium with direct lending. In Section 3 we examine the conditions under which a credit market equilibrium exists with a monopolistic or competitive Þnancial intermediation sector and the effect of liberalizing the capital account. In Section 4 we discuss conditions under which opening the capital account strengthens or weakens the role of Þnancial intermediation in the credit market. Section 5 concludes and Appendix A contains all the proofs.
Credit Market with Direct Lending and No Monitoring

Basic Model
There are inÞnitely many agents in the economy, with total measure 1. Each agent is endowed with one unit of a single good which can either be consumed or invested. A subset of the agents is also endowed with an indivisible investment project that requires K units of investment of the single good, and K > 3. To fund its project, an agent must borrow an additional K − 1 units. If an agent invests in a project he becomes the single owner of the Þrm that carries out the project. Not all investment projects are identical and agents are differentiated by the type of project in their endowments. There are four types of agents:
1) Type G agents (t G ) have access to a project that gives a certain return g per unit investment and a total of G = K · g; there is mass α G of this type of agents.
2) Type B agents (t B ) have access to a project that returns b per unit investment and a total of B = K · b with probability π and returns 0 with probability 1 − π; there is mass α B of this type of agents.
3) Type BG agents (t BG ) have access to two projects: a project identical to the project of type G agents and a project identical to the type B agents; there is mass α BG of this type of agents.
4)
Type L agents (t L ) have no projects and are pure lenders; there is mass 1 − α G − α B − α BG of this type of agents.
The following assumptions describe our view of a developing country: not enough capital to Þnance all positive NPV projects, the presence of many negative NPV projects and potentially serious moral hazard problems.
The economy's endowment is too small to fund all of the G projects but is large enough to fund all of the B projects. The B project has a negative NPV and the G project has a positive NPV, but when successful the B project returns more than the G project. Based on Assumption 2, loan contracts cannot be contingent on an agent's type or action.
Given a loan contract, successful Þrms must choose between repaying their loans or defaulting.
Liquidation on the project is triggered automatically by a default at the end of the period and this liquidation technology destroys all output. Allowing for a less drastic liquidation technology does not alter our results, but complicates the analysis.
Borrowing and lending can be carried out in the private loan market. The optimal contract between a lender and a borrower at Time 0 is a debt contract, with a speciÞed interest rate on the loan. 1 At the end of the period lenders can either recover the loan repayment or liquidate a defaulted Þrm.
Given an interest rate on all loans, r, and repayment probability of loans, γ, an agent's action, a i , i = L, B, G, BG; is chosen from the set, {B, G, L, C} , where a i = B (G) represents a type i agent investing in bad (good) project, and a i = L (C) represents a type i agent lending (consuming) his endowment. We deÞne the value functions of different types of agents as: 2
We consider the decision of each type of agent in turn, based on (1):
Type L: Pure Lenders face a very simple decision: either lend the endowment to a Þrm to invest or consume the endowment. Based on the default rate, 1 − γ, and the interest rate on loan, r, type L agents will make the following choice on actions:
When the expected return to lending is greater than 1, type L agents lend their endowment.
Type G: These agents choose between consuming, investing in their project, or lending funds.
Given the pair (γ, r) , we have the following decision rule:
1 For formal arguments see Gale and Hellwig (1983) and Diamond (1984) . 2 The payoffs from borrowing and investing in a project are based on the assumption that there is no credit rationing. We relax this assumption in Sections 2.2 and 3.2.
For a Þxed repayment rate, γ, raising the interest rate increases a type G agent's incentive to lend rather than to invest. For a Þxed interest rate, r, lowering the repayment rate reduces an agent's incentive to lend as it lowers the expected return to lending.
Type B: They have access to a risky project with a potentially higher return than the G projects.
Given the pair (γ, r) , a type B agent's decision rule is as follows:
Similar to type G agents, holding the repayment rate constant, a higher interest rate lowers the return of investing in its project relative to lending.
Type BG: The action space of type BG entrepreneurs is a union of the action spaces of type B and G agents, because they have access to both the risky and safe project. Hence the decision rule is given by:
1−π and r < min¯π 
Because of the limited liability, as long as an individual prefers to invest, the decision of which project depends upon the interest rate, r. As the interest rate increases the type BG 0 s incentive to invest in the risky project relative to the safe project increases. There is a maximum interest rate r BG consistent with a type BG Þrm investing in a safe project.
1−π represent the interest rate of (unmonitored) debt at which a type BG agent is indifferent between investing in its safe project and its risky project.
We can interpret r BG as measuring the degree of moral hazard in investment. With asymmetric information, the t BG agents prefer to borrow and invest in B projects, if the interest rate on the loan exceeds r BG . This is true because these agents only pay back the loan in the good state (with probability π), and default on the loan when return is zero (with probability 1 − π). When the interest rate further increases, the t BG agents' incentive of shifting from G to B projects becomes stronger. Thus the lower the critical value r BG , the more serious the moral hazard problem that exists in the investment decision for the entrepreneurs. We will show that an increase in the interest rate in the economy may cause an aggregate shifting toward risky, negative NPV projects in the economy.
Equilibrium in the Closed Economy
If a Social Planner observes the types and actions of each agent, he will allow a proportion σ F B = 1 (α BG +α G )K of G projects to be funded, and will not allow any B project to be funded. All the agents in the economy lend their endowment to fund the G projects and the total output in the economy (GDP) is g. This is the First Best solution in the closed economy. In a competitive equilibrium, some of the agents with projects need to be lenders so that the private market for directly placed loans clears. c) interest rate on loans (also face value of unmonitored debt) r * , and repayment rate γ * : under these rates, no single agent is willing to deviate from his position.
With direct lending there are two types of competitive equilibria:
1. No credit rationing -the interest rate rises to clear the loan market. There are two types of equilibria with no credit rationing characterized by the type of project chosen by the type BG agents: In the Good equilibrium, the type BG agents invest in their safe projects, while in the Bad equilibrium, the type BG agents invest in their risky projects.
2.
Credit rationing -the interest rate does not rise to clear the loan market. Increasing in the interest rate will cause a shift into riskier projects and reduce the return to lending.
We will consider each of these equilibria in order. In the case where type BG agents choose the safe project, they are choosing the socially efficient project, so we call this the "Good equilibrium" and then describe the case where the type BG agents choose the risky project as the "Bad equilibrium".
Good equilibrium: In order for market for loans to clear, not all the G projects can be funded, and some of the t BG and t G agents have to become lenders. This implies in equilibrium these agents must be indifferent between lending and investing in G.
Lemma 1
In the Good equilibrium, t B agents are lenders, while t BG and t G agents are indifferent between lending and investing in G projects. A fraction, σ Good = 1 (α BG +α G )K , of G projects is funded in equilibrium, and the risk-free interest rate is r * = r Good f = g. This equilibrium exists iff
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
Thus the good equilibrium is characterized by a high level of the critical interest rate, r BG , and by our earlier claim, a less severe degree of moral hazard problem in the investment environment. This is possible when the return on the safe project is not much different from the high return from the risky project. This equilibrium is socially optimal since it generates the same output level as the Planner's solution and there is no need for monitoring entrepreneurs. Figure 1a illustrates the good equilibrium in the (V, r) space. 
Figure 1b Bad Equilibrium
Bad equilibrium: In this equilibrium the interest rate will adjust to allow the market for loans to clear and type BG agents will invest in their risky project, which is socially inefficient.
Lemma 2 In the Bad equilibrium, t BG and t B agents invest in B projects and a fraction σ Bad =
of t G agents invests in G projects. The equilibrium debt repayment rate, γ * , and interest rate on all loans, r * , are
.
Furthermore, r Bad f ≡ γ Bad r Bad ≥ 1, and the equilibrium exists iff r Bad ≥ max
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
Thus in the bad equilibrium, there is severe moral hazard problem, characterized by a low level of the critical interest rate, r BG . All the B projects and only a fraction of the G projects are funded, which implies a high rate of default. As a result, the lenders demand a high rate of return to compensate the possible losses from their investment. Figure 1b illustrates the bad equilibrium with the value function of type BG agents.
Credit Rationing and Multiple Equilibria: In this type of equilibrium, the interest rate does not adjust to clear the market for loans. In particular, when facing excess demand, lenders do not raise the interest rate, as any increase in the interest rate will alter the borrower's project choice and lower the lender's expected return. Thus, in a credit rationing equilibrium, type BG agents are just indifferent between investing in their risky and safe projects and an increase in the interest rate will shift all of them into the risky project, and drive down the expected return of a lender. In this sense, credit rationing forms the boundaries for the Good equilibrium. However, as the interest rate rises a small amount, the t BG agents shift from G to B agents, which further drives up the interest rate, which in turn leads to the Bad equilibrium.
Because all agents with projects would like to borrow and invest, but not all agents can borrow and invest, there will be credit rationing in the equilibrium. A simple structure to allocate credit is to assume that there is a lottery. If an agent wins the lottery, he then can choose between borrowing, lending or consuming. If an agent loses, then he chooses between consuming and lending. In this way all funds can be lent and used to invest in projects. 3 Details of the equilibrium is presented in Appendix B.
Equilibrium in the Open Economy
To make our main points of the paper, we will focus on an economy in which the Bad Equilibrium exists in the credit market with direct lending. We will proceed to examine the role of a Þnancial intermediary in solving the moral hazard problem in project selection and then examine how opening the capital account affects the role of the FI.
Following the standard assumptions in the literature, the introduction of foreign capital brings two changes: the supply of capital is inÞnitely elastic at the international expected rate of return on lending; second, the home country is small so its activity will not alter the international rate. 4 The other question in consideration is whether domestic investors have access to the international credit market and whether foreign investors have access to the Þnancial sector in the domestic economy.
First, following the liberalization of capital account, domestic rate of returns on loans will equate that of the international market, and that the supply of funds is inÞnitely elastic at this rate:
: opening capital account will lead to a fall in the expected rate of return on loans in the domestic credit market. We will further differentiate two cases whether domestic investors have access to the international credit market or not.
• r W > r Bad f : opening capital account will lead to a rise in expected rate of return on loans in the domestic credit market. If domestic investors have access to the international credit market, then there can be capital ßight out of the domestic credit market.
In the meantime, along with the in-ßow of foreign capital, whether there will also be Þnancial sector liberalization will determine the structure of the Þnancial intermediation:
• No foreign intermediaries can enter the domestic Þnancial sector: this implies the domestic FI will have access to unlimited supply of funds while not worrying about competition from other FIs
• The presence of foreign FIs or large investors: allowing these to enter the home Þnancial sector will make domestic lenders better-off, since now the home FI faces the zero proÞt constraint
We will study each of the above cases in turn. The only case we explore here is direct lending in the open economy. We later show that the free ßow of capital may cause problems for the intermediaries in the open economy and we consider the government practise of restricted ßow of capital and prevents the ßight of domestic capital to the international market but allows foreign capital to ßow in.
Before we derive the competitive equilibrium in the open economy, we need the following notations and assumptions:
, where r W is the expected rate of return on lending in the world market.
Open´i s the constant repayment rate in the domestic loan market if all B (G) projects are funded, and type BG agents choose the B (G) projects. Given r W and γ Bad Open , r Bad Open is the corresponding interest rate on loan that makes a lender indifferent between lending his endowment to a random, domestic entrepreneur and investing in the world market.
Open ¶ , where r BG is deÞned in DeÞnition 1.
Hence there will be inßow (outßow) of foreign capital (domestic capital), if the home country liberalizes its capital account and open its credit market to foreign investors and that r W < r Bad f ³ r W > r Bad f´. Assumption 3 also states that the exogenous, world rate of return is bounded below and above so that our analysis on the transition from closed to open economies is interesting. 5 However, any uninformed investor in the credit market still needs to access the probability of default when lending funds to a random entrepreneur. 5 If r W is too low, the domestic economy will transform from a bad equilibrium to a good one following liberalization, without the monitoring of the Þnancial intermediation sector. On the other hand, if r W is too high, all t G agents will become lenders in world market rather than investing in G projects thus no project will be funded in the competitive, open economy.
Lemma 3 Following capital in-ßow into the closed economy with a bad equilibrium deÞned in Lemma 2, there is a unique equilibrium in the open economy, in which t BG and t B agents invest in B, and all t G agents invest in G. The equilibrium debt repayment rate, and interest rate on loans, are γ * = γ Bad Open > γ Bad , and r * = r Bad Open .
The crucial difference between competitive equilibria in closed and open economies is the role of t G agents. In the closed economy, due to the lack of funds, loan market clearing dictates that they are indifferent between lending and investing in G project, and that their lending provides the slack for supply of funds. In the open economy with inÞnitely elastic supply of funds at the price of r W , t G agents strictly prefer investing in G projects to lending, so long as the interest rate on unmonitored loan is not too high (Assumption 3). Therefore, in the open economy equilibrium, the repayment rate is higher as all G projects are funded along with all B projects. But because the interest rate for unmonitored debt, r Bad Open , is still higher than the boundary level r BG , all the bad projects are still funded in the equilibrium, as in the closed economy.
Numerical Examples
We now present a set of examples to make the point that the model may yield different equilibria depending on the region of parameters. We later use the same set of parameters to characterize the economy with FI. In Example 2, because the G projects are rare and require large amount of investment, and the payoff for B projects is risky, the moral hazard problem is severe, characterized by the low critical face value of debt, r BG . As a result, the only equilibrium is the one in which all the B projects are funded. In the rest of the paper, we will focus on the situation illustrated by Example 2, and study how we can remedy the moral hazard problem in investment.
Credit Market with Monitored Loans and the Structure of Intermediation Sector
In this section, we introduce a costly and imperfect monitoring technology. With this technology, as in Diamond (1984) and Williamson (1986) , Þnancial intermediaries may arise to solve the moral hazard problem. In our baseline case, we solve the model when there is a single FI with this technology and no foreign borrowing. We choose this as our baseline based on our belief that many developing economies are characterized by non-competitive Þnancial intermediaries and within this framework it is straightforward to introduce distortions from a non-competitive Þnancial intermediaries. We will derive the monopolist FI's proÞt-maximizing pricing schedule on loans and deposits, 
Monitoring Technology and Incentive to Monitor
In an environment with a severe moral hazard problem uninformed lenders require a high interest payment to compensate for the high probability of default from lending to an agent investing in a B project. Alternatively, lenders could rely on an intermediary to Þrst acquire a costly monitoring technology and Þnd out a Þrm's type after the Þrm's project choice has been made, but before the Þnal payoff is realized. 6 The intermediary can receive deposits from lenders and lend to, monitor 6 We assume that the cost of acquiring the monitoring technology is prohibitively expensive so that no individual lender will do so. This is reasonable beyond the monetary cost, as an intermediary can save cost from repeated monitoring of the same large project by small lenders (e.g., Diamond 1984 With the technology, the FI can observe the choice of a B project with probability p, p ∈ (0, 1], although this observation is not veriÞable by a third party. Any entrepreneur choosing the B project is caught with probability p and is not caught with probability 1 − p (Diamond 1991). If an entrepreneur has chosen a G project, she will never be mistaken for having chosen a B project.
If the FI observes that a B project has been undertaken, the FI can either liquidate the project before the realization of return, or renegotiate the terms of the loan contract with the entrepreneur and continue with the project. Figure 2 summarizes the sequence of events with FI entering the credit market.
Assumption 4
With early liquidation at Time 3, the FI can recover a fraction l ∈ (πb, 1) of the input per unit investment.
Because the value of early liquidation exceeds the expected payoff of continuing with the bad project, the FI will liquidate any project receiving a bad signal (at Time 3). If the monitoring is not informative, we assume that the FI cannot renegotiate to increase the initial interest rate. 7 A related question to ask is whether there should be monitoring of the monitor. On the deposit side, the single FI can offer all depositors a promised rate of return that is high enough so that it can pool in all funds in the entire economy. Using the proceeds from deposits the FI can lend to as many projects as feasible. Since we assume that the FI can commit to investing in the monitoring technology at Time 0, it will monitor to separate good projects from bad projects because doing so can increase its expected proÞts. We also assume that the payoff of all the B projects are not perfectly correlated, thus massive defaults and a bank run will never occur. 8 In summary, as long as the FI earns a non-negative expected proÞts from receiving deposits, lending, monitoring, and liquidating entrepreneurs, then it will indeed acquire the costly monitoring technology at Time 0 and monitor all projects. This in turn ensures that the depositors do not need to monitor the FI (Diamond 1983 ). This will become clear once we solve the FI's proÞt maximization problem. In what follows we will show how well the credit market equilibrium with a FI approximates the First Best outcome.
Monopolistic FI in the Closed Economy
We Þrst solve the problem facing a monopolistic FI in the closed economy. As in Allen and Gale (2000), we interpret the monopolistic FI to be a network of branches in the economy, rather than competing units, with all branches having the same goal of maximizing proÞts for the network. As stated above, the monopolist FI can maximize proÞts by offering the lowest possible rate of return on deposits, charging the highest interest rate on loans, monitoring all projects and liquidating bad projects when possible.
With the FI in place, we need to reconsider the investment decisions of all types of agents. Each 7 A sufficient condition for this to hold is that only credible threats by the FI can be used in bargaining at Time 3 (e.g., Aghion, Dewatripont, and Rey 1994, Gorton and Kahn 2000). If we assume that the expected value of a loan conditional on not being monitored to be B is higher than the (early) liquidation value, then any threat of liquidation by the FI is not credible, i.e., when agent's decision now depends on the return on deposits and the interest rate R on loans from the FI. As mentioned above, because there will be no bank runs in the economy, the FI can promise a certain rate of return, r F I f , to depositors, based on the loans that the FI makes. In this case, we rewrite the each agent's value function, previously deÞned in (1) in Section 2.1, with an interest rate R for a loan of K units rather than K − 1. Writing the loan this way makes it easier to characterize each agent's behavior and simpliÞes deriving FI's optimal loan schedule.
The interest rates on deposits ³ r F I f´a nd loans (R) will both inßuence the actions and the choice of projects by the agents, as shown in (1) - (5) in Section 2.1. To help understand the FI's optimal pricing schedule we Þrst deÞne the following critical levels of interest rates and monitoring technology, based on the value functions in (8):
DeÞnition 4 Let r f denote the risk-free interest rate an investor can earn in the credit market,
Let R BG equal the interest rate on loan at which t BG agents are indifferent between investing in B or G projects. When monitoring is completely uninformative (p = 0) R BG is equivalent to r BG , the critical interest rate in the unmonitored loan market from DeÞnition 1 (with re-scaling). A better monitoring technology (an increase in p) can increase the t BG agents' incentive to choose the good project G over the bad project B by increasing the critical level of loan rate (R BG increases).
Let R B (R G ) be the interest rate on a loan that makes the t B ¡ t G ¢ agents indifferent between investing in B (G) project and depositing their endowment in the FI. Given a Þxed risk-free rate r f , when the FI charges a rate higher than R B (R G ) , t B agents (t G agents) will switch from investing in B (G) projects to depositing their endowment in the FI. A better monitoring technology (an increase in p) decreases the payoff of investing in B projects, as the negative NPV project will more likely be caught and liquidated by the FI. Accordingly, t B agents drop out of the loan side of the market and become depositors faster as the monitoring technology improves (R B is decreasing in p). On the other hand, R G is independent of the monitoring technology based on our assumption.
Finally, given r f (hence R G ), p BG is the critical monitoring technology of the FI under which t BG agents are indifferent between investing in B or G or becoming a depositor.
To summarize, as the monitoring technology improves (p increases), there are two positive effects on alleviating the degree of moral hazard problem in the credit market: Þrst, t B agents have less incentive to invest in the bad project compared to lending; second, t BG agents will have less incentive to invest in the bad project compared to investing in the good project.
Next, we show that it is the joint behavior of all agents given the FI's loan contracts and the availability of the funds that determine the equilibrium with FI. First, in order to take over the credit market for loans, the FI must make sure that all type G agents prefer to borrow funds from the FI to invest in their G projects, than to borrow from the direct loan market. If this is the case, the only potential borrowers left in the direct loan market are entrepreneurs of B projects.
Because a B project has a negative NPV, no lender would want to lend via the direct loan market, but would rather deposit their funds in the FI. Thus the bad equilibrium, characterized in Lemma 2 and Example 2, will fail to exist. However, the combinations of ³ r F I f , R´that attract t G to the FI also depends on the actions of t B and t BG agents, which in turn depends on the effectiveness of the monitoring technology (p) .
The other factor that complicates the FI's pricing strategies is the availability of funds in the economy. As stated earlier, the closed economy cannot fund all the G projects but can fund all the B projects. Since the FI is the sole institution that has the ability to monitor projects, issue loans and offer deposits, it can design and implement a lottery scheme whenever there is shortage of funds for entrepreneurs. For example, the FI can charge each of the entrepreneurs a non-refundable application fee (or collateral) of 1 (his endowment) at Time 1, and if the entrepreneur wins (loses) the lottery he receives the K units of funds and invests in a project (zero and the period ends).
Thus, the type G agents' payoff when borrowing from the FI is
and the type B agents' payoff when borrowing from the FI is 
We prove in the Appendix A.3 that this scheme maximizes the FI's expected proÞts, alleviates the degree of moral hazard problem for type B and BG agents, and along with the loan pricing schedule to be deÞned below makes the type G agents indifferent between borrowing from FI and from the direct loan market for all levels of monitoring technology (∀p ∈ [0, 1]) . 9
DeÞnition 5 In the closed economy with a monopolist FI, we deÞne R ∅ (p) to be the following loan pricing schedule: (p) will be included in the optimal loan pricing schedule. In particular, for moderately efficient monitoring technologies, 9 Notice that whether the loan application fee/collateral is refundable or not does not change t G agents' incentives to borrow from the FI because the loan rates are designed to ensure that this is the case. However, for both t B and t BG agents, losing the fee (the endowment) following a failed loan application reduces the value of investing in B projects, because unlike a G project, a B project returns positive payoff with only probability π < 1. Thus the above lottery scheme, along with the monitoring, alleviates the moral hazard problem of these agents' investment decisions.
the FI may gain from lowering the loan rate below R Close ∅ (p) if it leads all the type BG agents to change their investment choice from B to G projects. We will introduce the FI's optimal loan pricing schedule for a given level of monitoring technology below.
To understand R Close ∅ (p) it is best to start with the case where p = 1. In this case no agent would borrow from the F I and invest in B because that agent would get caught with certainty and lose his deposit. Because all the BG and G agents would want to borrow through the FI and invest in the G project but there are not enough funds, the FI implements the above lottery to G and BG agents/entrepreneurs and charges R Close ∅ (p = 1) to successful loan applicants so that the G agents are indifferent between borrowing from FI and borrowing from the direct loan market without monitoring. Notice that the cost of acquiring the monitoring technology affects the probability that a project gets funded and thus the loan prices, due to the aggregate resource constraint. 10 This is the last part of the pricing schedule in R Close
so that all the agents with projects will apply for loans, hence the probability of each applicant receiving a loan is lower, and the FI will not able to catch B projects. Accordingly we deÞne As p increases the value of being a B agent borrowing from the F I goes down as they are more likely to get caught. However, if B agents decide not to borrow from the F I, the probability of a G agent (and also a BG agent) receiving a loan in the lottery increases, which implies the F I can charge a higher loan rate without losing the G agents. This implies that there may be a range of the Max a) the equilibrium promised deposit rate, r F I f , is equal to 1; b) there exists 0 < p MON Close < p B , such that the monopolistic FI will charge the following rates based on their monitoring technology:
where R BG (p) is deÞned in DeÞnition 4, and R Close 
where R Close
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
The intuition for part a) is as follows. The FI needs only to promise a rate of r F I f = 1 to attract all depositors in the economy. As stated above, so long as the type G agents prefer to borrow from the FI rather than from the direct loan market, the market for direct lending collapses as no lender wants to lend to B projects, the only type of projects remaining. Therefore, all potential lenders will deposit their endowment in the FI which guarantees them a rate no lower than consuming the endowment. and t B agents. To eliminate the moral hazard problem in these agents' choices of actions the FI must lower both R and raise r F I f at the same time. As this is costly, the proÞt-maximizing FI charges the rate R ∅ (p = 0) to make sure that t G agents borrow from the FI. In this case, the FI is monitoring to catch agents investing in B projects.
The above loan pricing strategy will change when the monitoring technology improves to a critical level, p MON Close . At this point it becomes proÞtable to use pricing and monitoring to alter the behavior of t BG agents, which is not reßected in the pricing schedule of R Close ∅ (p) in (12) . To maximize proÞts from all loans, the FI lowers the loan rate and charges the rate R BG (p). At this loan rate with the corresponding monitoring technology, and the lottery scheme described above, the t BG agents will switch from B to G projects while the t B agents will invest in B projects. As the monitoring technology further advances, t B agents will drop out of the loan side of the credit market because the chance of being caught by the FI's monitoring and liquidated is too high, and the resulting equilibrium is First Best in terms of project composition in the equilibrium.
Finally, when the monitoring technology approaches perfection (p → 1), we have that R BG (p) > R Close ∅ (p) . However, the loan rate cannot be higher than R Close ∅ (p) , otherwise t G agents would strictly prefer to borrow from the direct loan market where they would earn a higher expected rate of return, which would in turn destroy the equilibrium with FI as the sole provider of loans.
To make our point clear on why the FI will switch its loan pricing strategy from charging R Close ∅ (p = 0) to R BG (p) , as monitoring technology improves, we presents a numerical example in The intuition for part c) of Proposition 1 is clear: As we have assumed throughout the paper, the FI acquires the monitoring technology at Time 0, and this is observable to all parties in the economy. The FI is willing to acquire this costly technology if it allows the FI to make a proÞt from providing and monitoring the loans. This implies that there is a critical level of the technology such that the monopolist FI is willing to enter the credit market and functions on both the deposit and lending sides.
Monopolistic FI in the Open Economy
In the open economy under Assumption 3 and that the monopolistic FI maintains its status as the single institution to provide loans and to monitor projects, it solves the same problem as in ¡ FI Close ¢ , except now the promised rate of return on deposits is exogenously given by the international credit market, r W , and that the supply of funds is inÞnitely elastic. This simpliÞes the analysis on the FI's optimal loan rates as no lottery is needed. Based on our results from the closed economy, we have similar results for the monopolistic FI's optimal pricing strategy in the open economy.
First, as in the case of closed economy, there exists an critical level of monitoring technology which deÞnes the regions of the monopolist FI's optimal loan rates for the open economy. This is shown by the dashed line in Figure 4 above. Following the calibrations in Example 2, we assume that r W = 1.03 < r Bad f = 1.064. As stated above, the proÞt-maximizing FI will switch from charging r Bad Open , which is deÞned in DeÞnition 3 and Lemma 3, to R BG , once the monitoring technology is sophisticated enough. Second, we can see that the critical value of p is higher in the closed economy than in the open economy. This occurs because in the closed economy the direct lending alternative for a t G entrepreneur yields a lower value (1) than in the open economy (r W ). Consequently, the monopolist FI can extract more surplus from the entrepreneurs in the closed economy than in the open economy. In order to provide incentive for the t BG agents to invest in their G projects, the monopolist FI must lower the interest rate to all agents equally. Because the monopolist FI can charge a higher interest rate in the closed economy the cost of charging an interest rate that changes the behavior of t BG agents is greater. This implies that monopolist FI will switch from the pricing strategy of allowing all B projects to get funded through itself, to the one that gives t BG agents incentive to switch from B to G project by charging the critical level of loan rate of R BG , faster. We will present the implications of this result when we study the transition from closed to open economies in the next section. The next proposition summarizes our results so far regarding monopolist FI in the open economy.
Proposition 2 Given Assumption 3, if there exists an equilibrium with a monopolistic FI in the
open economy, the FI's optimal decision rules is as follows: a) the equilibrium promised deposit rate, r F I f , is equal to r W ; b) there exists p MON Open > 0, such that the monopolistic FI will charge the following based on their monitoring technology:
where R 
Proof. See Appendix A.4. charged by the FI will ensure that t G agents remain in the FI's loan market when monitoring technology is underdeveloped (low p). Notice we must re-scale r Bad Open because we deÞne the interest rate charged by the FI based on a loan of K units rather than K − 1 units for the direct loan market. As the monitoring technology becomes moderately efficient, the FI will lower the loan rate to R BG (p) so that t BG agents switch from B to G projects. Finally when the monitoring technology approaches perfection (p → 1) , the FI must go back to the loan rate of R Open ∅ so that t G agents will not deviate from the FI's credit channel. Figure 5 illustrates the optimal loan rates charged by the monopolistic FI in the open economy. The entry decision of the monopolist FI in the open economy is also similar to that in the closed economy.
Competitive FI Sector in the Open Economy
So far we have studied the case of a capital account liberalization in which there is no entry in the Þnancial intermediation sector so the domestic FI retains its monopolist status. We now examine a situation in which the domestic monopolist FI must compete with foreign FIs. We assume that there are inÞnitely many foreign investors or institutions each endowed with at least K − 1 units of capital, and hence can fund a project by themselves. We also assume that there is no extra cost of entry other than incurring c to acquire the monitoring technology or any other restrictions (to be added later as a policy issue) on the foreign investors. Foreign investors also have access to the same costly monitoring technology. With this structure, there will be competition between the domestic and foreign FIs in terms of funding the projects at Time 0. The domestic FI cannot charge borrowers the rate that maximizes its monopolistic proÞts because the borrowers would then Þnance with the foreign FIs. Competition from foreign FIs will drive ex ante proÞts to zero.
Whether an entrepreneur borrows from the domestic or a foreign FI, in the case where monitoring catches an investment in B, the bad project will be liquidated and the FI will recover l per unit of investment. On the deposit side, both the domestic and foreign FIs need only to promise small investors a rate of r W . What we show next is that due to the competition from foreign FIs the domestic FI may lose its advantage and incentive in monitoring entrepreneurs and this leads to an aggregate worsening of the composition of investment projects.
DeÞnition 6 ProÞt function of each competitive FI in the open economy:
for i = 1, 2, 3; where Pr (G) i = 1 − Pr (B) i , and
Hence π COM (R) denotes the proÞt earned by any FI in the open economy with a perfectly competitive FI sector on each randomly selected loan. As our analysis for the monopolist FI indicates, there will be three regions of p from which different combinations of projects will get funded in equilibrium. From the expression of Π COM , we can see that it is composed of revenues from lending to a random entrepreneur and the cost of capital, which equals the cost of monitoring plus the international expected rate of return. We next derive a competitive FI's pricing strategy on its loans, as a function of the prevailing industry monitoring technology (p), as we did for the monopolistic FI in Propositions 1 and 2.
Proposition 3 In an equilibrium with competitive FIs, there exist p COM Open and e p COM Open , with p COM Open < e p COM Open , such that the monopolistic FI will charge the following based on their monitoring technology:
Furthermore, both p COM Open and e p COM Open are increasing in r W .
Proof. See Appendix A.5. The pricing structure is derived using the strategy utilized by the monopolist FI that maximizes its proÞts together with the zero proÞt condition applied on each random loan. Figure 6 illustrates the result in Proposition 3 in a more intuitive way. The monopolist FI maximizes its proÞts and its positive proÞts increase as the monitoring technology improves. Because a competitive FI always makes zero proÞts in equilibrium, this implies that the FI passes along more of the monopolist FI's proÞts to the entrepreneurs and the lenders, as the technology becomes more advanced, which generates the downward sloped curve of the optimal pricing relationship between technology and loan rates. As above, whether the competitive FIs can indeed take over the credit market and
Þnance the projects depends on whether they can attract the t G agents to borrow from them instead of the direct loan market in the open economy. The next proposition answers this question. 
Proposition 4 There exists
b p COM Open ∈ ³ p COM Open , 1´such that t G
Capital Account Liberalization and the Transition from Closed to Open Economies
We are now in a position to study the implications of opening the capital account and liberalizing the Þnancial sector on the structure of Þnancial intermediation and aggregate output. We take the simple view that a capital account liberalization is a change from a closed to open economies and that a Þnancial liberalization is a change from a monopolistic FI to a competitive FI sector. Based on these deÞnitions we examine two cases: 1) a capital account liberalization with a monopolist FI and 2) a capital account and Þnancial liberalization. We Þnd that in each of these cases the change can have positive or negative implications depending on the efficiency and cost of the monitoring technology and the world interest rate.
Monopoly FI in Both Closed and Open Economies
The implications are based on the results obtained in Section 3. In Propositions 1 and 2 and Lemma 4, we know that the monopolist FI earns a higher proÞt in the closed economy than it can in the open economy. This is true because the opportunity cost of the small, individual depositors in the closed economy is 1, compared to that of r W in the open economy with liberalization in the capital account. Moreover, the FI can charge a higher loan rate in the closed economy without worrying about the t G agents switching from investing in G to lending. As a result, the FI's entry level monitoring technology is lower in the closed economy than in the open. Proof. See Appendix A.7.
Going from a closed to an open economy changes the FI's problem in three ways: 1) it raises the FI's cost of capital as the FI must compete with other FI's for capital 2) it eliminates any additional rents the FI received from being able to ration credit through the lottery 3) it changes the opportunity cost of borrowing from the FI which alters the rate at which the FI lends. When
it is clear that the Þrst two effects will dominate so that there exists a monitoring cost
When r W ∈ ³ 1, r Bad f´t he FI faces a higher cost of capital but can extract more surplus from the each loan. Of these two effects, the higher cost of capital dominates so that Open is increasing in r W so that the gap between the two critical interest rates widens as the interest rate in the world market further decreases. 1 1 Since the total output with monitoring would still be higher if there is no investment in B, a solution to the problem could be that the government implements a tax and transfer scheme that taxes all entrepreneur for the amount enough to cover monitoring cost of the FI and uses it as a subsidy to the FI. Based on Propositions 1 and 2 and Lemma 5, the monopoly FI in the open economy will adopt its loan strategy of R BG , which will make t BG agents switch from B to G projects sooner at a less advanced monitoring technology than in the closed economy. Thus, by liberalizing capital account and allowing the monopolist FI to maintain its market power there will be a shift into the positive NPV projects. Therefore, if a country's FI's monitoring technology is in this intermediate range, opening the capital account will increase the measure of projects being funded and lead to a positive shift in the composition of projects that get funded. Moreover, the fact that p MON Open is increasing in r W , implies that the country should open its capital account when the opportunity cost of investing in the world market is low rather than high.
Monopoly FI in Closed Economy to Competitive FI in Open Economy
Again, we compare the results we derived in Section 3 but now we allow for competition in the Þnancial intermediation sector in the open economy accompanying capital account liberalization.
In particular, we assume that there are many Þnancial intermediaries that raise funds at the world interest rate. In Proposition 1 and Proposition 3, we show that the monopolist FI earns a higher proÞt in the closed economy than a competitive FI's zero proÞt in the open economy. Similar to the result we obtained for the monopoly FI, we have the following result establishing the impact of capital account and Þnancial liberalization on the domestic credit market. The above result is intuitive and shown in Figure 8 . When the monitoring technology is in the range where a monopolist FI can make positive proÞts by monitoring, then it will enter the credit market and captures the funds in the economy and lend to a fraction of the total available projects. However, in the open economy under competition the same domestic FI has to rely on better technology to survive as the opportunity cost of lending is higher, so the FI is driven out of the credit market because its revenue from the gap between the loan rates and promised deposit rates diminishes and it cannot cover its monitoring cost. This means all the bad projects and the 
Summary and Concluding Remarks
This paper builds on the burgeoning literature that studies the macroeconomic implications of the Þnancial sector in developing economies. While much of the previous work concentrates on the role of Þnancial intermediaries in providing liquidity, we concentrate on the role of Þnancial intermediaries in resolving moral hazard problems. We construct a model of endogenous Þnancial intermediation, in the spirit of Diamond (1984) and Williamson (1986) It suffices that we check the non-binding restrictions, which require that all the lenders prefer to lend and type BG prefers to invest in G to B. Preferring lending to consuming requires that γ Good r Good ≥ 1 and preferring investment in G to B requires that r Good ≤ r BG . Consequently, in order for this to be an equilibrium it must be that r Good ∈ [1, r BG ].
A.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Facing a high rate of debt, the t BG agents prefer to invest in the risky project, as the higher cost of capital decreases the return on the G project more than it does to the B project. There are additional non-binding restrictions which require that lenders prefer lending to consuming and type BG prefers to invest in B to G. Preferring lending to consuming requires that expected rate of return on lending, γ Bad r Bad ≥ 1 and preferring investment in B to G requires that r ≥ r BG .
Consequently, in order for this to be an equilibrium it must be that r ≥ max
A.3 Proof of Proposition 1
The proof of part a) is in the text. To prove part b), we Þrst prove that the pricing schedule R ∅ (p) makes the t G agents indifferent between borrowing from the FI or from the direct lending market. Moreover, the pricing schedule R ∅ (p) will be derived to be consistent with the fact that the FI may have to use a lottery to ration credit and therefore the probability of a t G agent being
Þnanced may be less than 1. To derive R ∅ (p) it is easiest to begin working with the two extreme monitoring technologies (p = 0, 1).
When p = 1, the monitoring technology is perfect so that no agent would borrow from the F I and invest in B because that agent would get caught with certainty. By (9) in Section 3.2, the condition on t G agents is:
With all the t BG and t G agents borrowing through the FI, there are not enough funds to Þnance all projects. Given the resource constraint the probability of an entrepreneur that seeks funding getting funded is
For a range of very efficient monitoring technologies p ∈ [p B , 1] the B agents will have no incentive to attempt to get loans because the probability of getting caught is too high. Because the B agents do not seek loans, the probability of a G agent getting a loan remains constant in this range so that F I will charge this same rate on loans of K units.
When p = 0, monitoring is useless so all agents willing to borrow under direct lending will borrow from the FI. Given our assumption that all agents with projects seek funding under direct lending, all agents with projects will seek funding from the FI. This increased demand for funding lowers the probability an agent succeeds in getting funding is 1/(1+c) (α G +α BG +α B )K and requires the FI to charge borrowers a lower interest rate to compensate for the lower probability of securing funding.
This implies that
For a range of inefficient monitoring technologies p ∈ h 0, p B i monitoring is not a deterrent to B agents borrowing and investing so that all agents will continue to seek funding and the probability of getting funding will not change implying that the FI will continue charging R Close ∅ (p = 0) for these different monitoring technologies.
With moderately efficient monitoring technologies p ∈ ³ p B ,p B´n ot all B agents will seek funding and therefore the loan rate will change. Notice that p B 6 =p B . If p B =p B then a small change in p would lead all B agents to exit the market for loans and there would be a discrete jump in the probability an agent applying for a loan would receive a loan. Given a higher probability of a loan, the FI would charge a t G agent a higher interest rate (without changing the a t G agent's expected Þnancing cost). Given a higher probability of achieving Þnancing the B agents and the fact that the t B agents only pay the higher interest rate when successful this implies that the cost of capital of t B agent would actually go down and hence some t B agents would apply for loans at p >p B which contradicts the deÞnition ofp B . In order to Þnd the range of p in which the B agents are indifferent between borrowing and lending, we let ω B (p) ∈ [0, α B ] represent the mass of B agents seeking loans at a particular p and let σ (p) represent the probability a random agent has a successful loan application, and by (10) 
To Þndp it suffices to examine the difference in proÞts from charging R Close ∅ (0) and R BG (p)
Setting this equal to zero and rearranging terms yields an implicit equation that deÞnesp as
The LHS represents the gains in terms of increased proÞts from setting a price that changes the behavior of the t BG agents while the RHS represents the costs in terms of lower income from the t B and t G agents whose behavior is unaffected by the lower cost of borrowing from the FI. 
A.4 Proof of Proposition 2
Similar to the proof of Proposition 1, we can deÞne:
as the FI's proÞt functions for to each project charging R BG (p) and R Open ∅ respectively for a K unit loan. Rearranging terms we get an implicit equation
that deÞnesp MON Open . Note that since R Open ∅ is decreasing in r W the opportunity cost of setting a price to alter the behavior of BG agents is decreasing in r W so that at higher world interest rates the FI will change its pricing behavior to R BG (p) with less effective monitoring technologies.
Everything else directly follows the steps of the proof of Proposition 1.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 3: to be completed.
A.6 Proof of Proposition 4: to be completed.
A.7 Proof of Lemma 4: to be completed.
A.8 Proof of Lemma 5: to be completed.
Appendix B
B.1 Equilibrium with Credit Rationing:
Lemma 6 In an equilibrium with credit rationing, all agents with projects prefer investing to lending, with type BG agents invest in the safe project, and a fraction σ CR = 1 (α B +α BG +α G )K of projects is funded. The equilibrium is characterized by a unique pair ¡ r CR , γ CR ¢ ,
The equilibrium exists iff
Furthermore, if r CR = r BG < g, then there also exists a bad equilibrium as characterized in (7).
We look at the case where not all individuals that seek to borrow can indeed borrow. If this is the case then individuals will strictly prefer investing to lending, but with some probability will end up lending. In this case σ CR is the probability that a random entrepreneur gets funded. Even though all funds get lent with this form of credit-rationing, there is rationing in the sense that the interest rate is not used to determine which individuals receive funding. A Þnal restriction on γ and r comes from the indifference to early consumption and preference for investment conditions and require that:
Note that since t BG agents are indifferent between investing in B and G projects, in equilibrium they will invest in G projects, and this enables us to characterize the equilibrium above.
